SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KANSAS, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL T. CRANE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
KANSAS
[January 22, 2002]
Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
case concerns the constitutional requirements substantively limiting the civil
commitment of a dangerous sexual offender–a matter that this Court considered
in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997). The State of Kansas argues that the Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted
our decision in Hendricks in an overly restrictive manner. We agree and
vacate the Kansas court’s judgment.
I
In Hendricks, this
Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§59—29a01 et seq. (1994), against constitutional challenge. 521 U.S., at
371. In doing so, the Court characterized the confinement at issue as civil,
not criminal, confinement. Id., at 369. And it held that the statutory
criterion for confinement embodied in the statute’s words “mental abnormality
or personality disorder” satisfied “
In reaching its conclusion,
the Court’s opinion pointed out that “States have in certain narrow
circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are
unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public
health and safety.” Id., at 357. It said that “we have consistently
upheld such involuntary commitment statutes” when (1) “the confinement takes
place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards,” (2) there is a
finding of “dangerousness either to one’s self or to others,” and (3) proof of
dangerousness is “coupled … with the proof of some additional factor, such as a
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’
The Court went on to
respond to Hendricks’ claim that earlier cases had required a finding, not of
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” but of “mental illness.” Id.,
at 358—359. In doing so, the Court pointed out that we “have traditionally left
to legislators the task of defining [such] terms.” Id., at 359. It then
held that, to “the extent that the civil commitment statutes we have considered
set forth criteria relating to an individual’s inability to control his
dangerousness, the Kansas Act sets forth comparable criteria.” Id., at
360. It added that Hendricks’ own condition “doubtless satisfies those
criteria,” for (1) he suffers from pedophilia, (2) “the psychiatric profession
itself classifies” that condition “as a serious mental disorder,” and (3)
Hendricks conceded that he cannot “
II
In the present case the
State of Kansas asks us to review the Kansas Supreme Court’s application of Hendricks.
The State here seeks the civil commitment of Michael Crane, a previously
convicted sexual offender who, according to at least one of the State’s
psychiatric witnesses, suffers from both exhibitionism and antisocial personality
disorder. In re Crane, 269 Kan. 578, 580—581, 7 P.3d 285, 287
(2000); cf. also American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders 569 (rev. 4th ed. 2000) (DSM—IV) (detailing
exhibitionism), 701—706 (detailing antisocial personality disorder). After a
jury trial, the Kansas District Court ordered Crane’s civil commitment. 269
Kan., at 579—584, 7 P.3d, at 286—288. But the Kansas Supreme Court reversed. Id.,
at 586, 7 P.3d, at 290. In that court’s view, the Federal Constitution as
interpreted in Hendricks insists upon “a finding that the defendant
cannot control his dangerous behavior”–even if (as provided by Kansas law)
problems of “emotional capacity” and not “volitional capacity” prove the
“source of bad behavior” warranting commitment. Ibid., see also Kan.
Stat. Ann. §59—29a02(b) (2000 Cum. Supp.) (defining “[m]ental abnormality” as a
condition that affects an individual’s emotional or volitional
capacity). And the trial court had made no such finding.
Kansas now argues that the
Kansas Supreme Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always
to prove that a dangerous individual is completely unable to control his
behavior. That reading, says Kansas, is far too rigid.
III
We agree with Kansas insofar
as it argues that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete
lack of control. Hendricks referred to the Kansas Act as requiring a
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it “difficult,
if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous
behavior.” 521 U.S., at 358 (emphasis added). The word “difficult” indicates
that the lack of control to which this Court referred was not absolute. Indeed,
as different amici on opposite sides of this case agree, an absolutist
approach is unworkable. Brief for Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Abusers as Amicus Curiae 3; cf. Brief for American Psychiatric
Association et al. as Amici Curiae 10; cf. also American
Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 11 (1982), reprinted
in G. Melton, J. Petrila, N. Poythress, & C. Slobogin, Psychological
Evaluations for the Courts 200 (2d ed. 1997) (“
We do not agree with the
State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim that the Constitution permits
commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks
without any lack-of-control determination. See Brief for Petitioner 17;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 22, 30—31. Hendricks underscored the constitutional
importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil
commitment “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt
with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” 521 U.S., at 360. That
distinction is necessary lest “civil commitment” become a “mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence”–functions properly those of criminal law,
not civil commitment. Id., at 372—373 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf.
also Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 Social
Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 231, 234 (1999) (noting that 40%—60%
of the male prison population is diagnosable with Antisocial Personality
Disorder). The presence of what the “psychiatric profession itself classifie[d]
… as a serious mental disorder” helped to make that distinction in Hendricks.
And a critical distinguishing feature of that “serious … disorder” there
consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior.
In recognizing that fact,
we did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or
technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at
issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with mathematical
precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the
case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental
abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
ordinary criminal case. 521 U.S., at 357—358; see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S.
71, 82—83 (1992) (rejecting an approach to civil commitment that would permit
the indefinite confinement “of any convicted criminal” after completion of a
prison term).
We recognize that Hendricks
as so read provides a less precise constitutional standard than would those
more definite rules for which the parties have argued. But the Constitution’s
safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not
always best enforced through precise bright-line rules. For one thing, the
States retain considerable leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality
disorders that make an individual eligible for commitment. Hendricks,
521 U.S., at 359; id., at 374—375 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For
another, the science of psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate
legal determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not
seek precisely to mirror those of the law. See id., at 359. See also, e.g.,
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,
81 (1985) (psychiatry not “an exact science”); DSM—IV xxx (“concept of mental
disorder … lacks a consistent operational definition”); id., at
xxxii—xxxiii (noting the “imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the information contained in [the DSM’s] clinical
diagnosis”). Consequently, we have sought to provide constitutional guidance in
this area by proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating gen-
erally stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances
require. Hendricks embodied that approach.
IV
The State also questions
how often a volitional problem lies at the heart of a dangerous sexual
offender’s serious mental abnormality or disorder. It points out that the
Kansas Supreme Court characterized its state statute as permitting commitment
of dangerous sexual offenders who (1) suffered from a mental abnormality
properly characterized by an “emotional” impairment and (2) suffered no
“volitional” impairment. 269 Kan., at 583, 7 P.3d, at 289. It adds that, in the
Kansas court’s view, Hendricks
absolutely forbids the commitment of any such person. 269 Kan., at 585—586,
7 P.3d, at 290. And the State argues that it was wrong to read Hendricks in
this way. Brief for Petitioner 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.
We agree that Hendricks
limited its discussion to volitional disabilities. And that fact is not
surprising. The case involved an individual suffering from pedophilia–a mental
abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack
of control. DSM—IV 571—572 (listing as a diagnostic criterion for pedophilia
that an individual have acted on, or been affected by, “sexual urges” toward
children). Hendricks himself stated that he could not “
Regardless, Hendricks must
be read in context. The Court did not draw a clear distinction between the
purely “emotional” sexually related mental abnormality and the “volitional.”
Here, as in other areas of psychiatry, there may be “considerable overlap
between a … defective understanding or appreciation and … [an] ability to
control … behavior.” American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity
Defense, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681, 685 (1983) (discussing “psychotic” individuals).
Nor, when considering civil commitment, have we ordinarily distinguished for
constitutional purposes among volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979). The Court in Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether
confinement based solely on “emotional” abnormality would be constitutional,
and we likewise have no occasion to do so in the present case.
*
For these reasons, the
judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.